Egocentric framing - one way people may fail in a switch dilemma: Evidence from excessive lane switching by Navon, David et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Egocentric framing - one way people may
fail in a switch dilemma: Evidence from
excessive lane switching
David Navon and Todd Kaplan and Ronen Kasten
University of Haifa, University of Haifa, University of Haifa
18. September 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50032/
MPRA Paper No. 50032, posted 21. September 2013 10:00 UTC
1        
  
 
Running head:  SWITCHING DUE TO EGOCENTRIC FRAMING 
 
 
Egocentric framing  - one way people may fail in a switch dilemma: 
Evidence from excessive lane switching 
 
 
David Navon     Todd R. Kaplan      Ronen Kasten 
The University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
David Navon 
Department Of Psychology 
The University of Haifa 
Haifa, Israel 31905  
 
Fax:   972 4 8240966  
Tel:   972 4 8240927 
 
Email:   dnavon@psy.haifa.ac.il 
 
    
2 SWITCHING DUE TO EGOCENTRIC FRAMING     
 
  
              
 
Abstract 
 
  To study switching behavior, an experiment mimicking the state of a driver on the road was 
conducted. In each trial participants were given a chance to switch lanes. Despite the fact that lane 
switching had no sound rational basis, participants often switched lanes when the speed of driving 
in their lane on the previous trial was relatively slow. That tendency was discerned even when 
switching behavior had been sparsely reinforced, and was especially marked in almost a third of 
the participants, who manifested it consistently. The findings illustrate a type of behavior occuring 
in various contexts (e.g., stocks held in a portfolio, conduct pertinent for residual life expectancy, 
supermarket queues). We argue that this behavior may be due to a fallacy reminiscent of that 
arising in the well-known “envelopes problem”, in which each of two players holds a sum of money 
of which she knows nothing about except that it is either half or twice the amount held by the other 
player. Players may be paradoxically tempted to exchange assets, since an exchange fallaciously 
appears to always yield an expected value greater than whatever is regarded as the player’s 
present assets. We argue that the fallacy is due to egocentrically framing the problem as if the 
“amount I have” is definite, albeit unspecified, and show that framing the paradox acentrically 
instead eliminates the incentive to exchange assets. A possible psychological source for the 
human disposition to frame problems in a way that inflates expected gain is discussed. Finally, a 
heuristic meant to avert the source of the fallacy is proposed.  
 
Keywords –  Decision making; Reasoning; Cognitive fallacies and biases;  
                     Switching  behavior 
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Egocentric framing  - one way people may fail in a switch dilemma: 
Evidence from excessive lane switching 
  
1. Introduction 
Much of human behavior tends to be stable, a pattern which researchers often attribute to 
risk aversion (see, e.g., Bell, 1982, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) or to the status quo bias 
(e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). In some cases, people seem reluctant to decide in favor of 
a switch of state even when doing so is likely to end in a considerable gain. It is not surprising that 
they behave so when the prospective gain is not intuitively transparent, as in the Monty Hall 
problem (see Granberg and Brown, 1995; Petrocelli & Harris, 2011), but sometimes they do that 
even when irrationality is reasonably salient, as when people continue to throw good money after 
bad in the face of sunk cost (see, e.g., Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Garland, 1990).  
Nonetheless, people sometimes opt for the contrary - a switch of state or a change in 
behavior in the light of slim evidence that such a change might be beneficial. Some people do it 
often enough to deserve being called "switch seekers".  
Switch seeking in the strong sense may be driven by exceptional discontent with what one 
has, by unrealistic expectations of what one could alternatively have (possibly induced by 
overevaluation of what others have), or by idiosyncratically high attraction to the change itself. 
Switch seeking of that sort seem confined to a small minority of persons, presumably having 
distinct personality characteristics.  
Could it be, though, that switch seeking is less eccentric in some specific conditions? Could 
it be that for switch seeking in the weak sense all that is needed is an absence of any preference 
for the status-quo? In this paper we set out to explore the possibility that a considerable proportion 
of people are disposed to manifest switch seeking in a sort of decision states, characterized by 
being basically symmetric and simple to specify objectively.  
The question is more than academic: If switch seeking of that kind was prevalent, it might 
turn out to be unhelpful or even counterproductive, not only for the decision maker but also for 
others, even for the whole community. A prominent example is the case of people, often called 
"noise traders", who rush to buy or sell stocks they hold based on insufficient evidence (e.g., 
Hughen & McDonald, 2005). It has been claimed that the activity of such noise traders accounts for 
much of the variance of stock exchange fluctuations. It seems reasonable to assume that noise 
traders are switch seekers that often act on the premise that they would be better off hitching a ride 
on another bandwagon.  
The fact that their decisions prove to be often wrong indicates that they are guided, or even 
driven, by some fallacious reasoning of the kind known to be quite prevalent in human intuitive 
decision making (cf, e.g., Gilovich, 1991; Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman , 2003; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Stanovich & West, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981) despite 
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its deviation from normative models, notably EV (Bernoulli, 1954/1738) and SEU (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944; cf also Fishburn, 1983; Karmarkar, 1978; Machina, 1982; Markowitz, 1952; 
Savage, 1954).   
The source of the fallacy in the reasoning that bears switching of that sort seems elusive. 
We explore the possibility that the culprit may be the fact that switching seems to be prescribed by 
a fallacious comparison of possible gain and possible loss, in a way that unfortunately might 
appear akin to what the normative procedure of maximizing expected gain. This is particularly well 
illustrated in the paradoxical envelopes problem.    
 
1.1 The envelopes problem 
Consider the following hypothetical problem: Suppose both you and another person are 
given sealed envelopes with amounts of money that neither of you knows anything about except 
that one of them is either twice as large or twice as small as the other one. Would you prefer to 
keep your own envelope or rather trade it with the other player?       
The problem, in various variants (e.g., Brams & Kilgour, 1995; Christensen & Utts, 1992; 
Nalebuff, 1988; Samet, Samet, & Schmeidler, 2004; Sobel, 1994; Zabell, 1988; see review in 
Nickerson & Falk, 2006), is often termed the "exchange paradox". It seems paradoxical for the 
following reason: The player appears to have a rational basis to opt for trading envelopes, since by 
that she buys the chance (with probability 0.5) to obtain a double amount, while risking (with the 
same probability) losing only a half of whatever she has. However, since the other player has the 
same rationale for trading envelopes, the two are bound to find themselves after the exchange at 
an identical decision point, hence apparently motivated to keep trading envelopes over and over 
had they not remember what had led to the first exchange.   
Since that behavior is apparently apt but really inapt, it seems paradoxical. Is it truly 
paradoxical? Nickerson & Falk (2006) argue that trading behavior in some variants of the problem 
is often justifiable given sound subjective assumptions, presumably tacit, about the distribution of 
possible amounts involved. Butler & Nickerson (2008) demonstrate that participants do trade at 
considerable rates when provided with explicit reasons to do so. Thus, even though people cannot 
explain very well the consequences of their behavior, it seems to be nonetheless adaptive in most 
naturalistic circumstances.   
However, the particularly interesting part of the puzzle is not that some people, even ones 
coached in rational decision making, may be led or tempted to trade envelopes, sometimes for a 
sensible reason. It is rather that some normative rule people are advised to apply - namely, "decide 
between options by expected value of gains" - prescribes such a behavior even when it is patently 
absurd. Realizing its odd consequences calls, of course, for reconstruing the problem in a way that 
recovers symmetry and stability, which various authors offered.1 Still, it is disturbing that even 
experts may be tempted to apply that normative rule in a misguided way. One may wish, then, to 
re-examine the premise that the applicability of that rule is universal.  
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Below we argue that the paradox results from applying that rule (namely, maximize 
expected gain) in a context that rather calls for another rule. We then discuss possible 
psychological accounts for such an error. Following that, we demonstrate a considerable 
propensity to switch in an experiment mimicking driving in a two-lane road.  
 
1.2 The fallacy      
It might be helpful to discuss the fallacy from the point of view of whoever is given the 
envelopes problem. We thus phrase the arguments below in the first person.   
If the problem is regarded as “I have Y dollars, the other player has either 2Y dollars or Y/2 
dollars”, then the dilemma whether or not to agree to an exchange is at first blush answered in the 
positive, because the expected value of an exchange is greater than Y dollars (0.5·2Y + 0.5·Y/2 = 
1.25Y). This reasoning is based on the premise that though the assets in my envelope are not 
specified, they must amount to a definite sum of Y dollars, so that my uncertainty is just with 
respect to the state of envelope assets of the other player: Does he have 2Y dollars or Y/2 dollars? 
Framed somewhat differently, my puzzlement under that premise is which of the following asset 
compositions is the real one - (1) I have Y dollars and he has 2Y dollars, (2) I have Y dollars and 
he has Y/2 dollars. The consequence is the same: It appears advantagous to exchange envelopes. 
However, actually my uncertainty is much greater. The symbol “Y” stands for my assets in 
the envelope. Normally that corresponds to a specific amount that I know. In this case, however, I 
do not know what that amount actually is, hence I do not have a tangible egocentric reference 
point. I should have noted that. Yet, referring to the amount in my envelope as Y, whatever the 
assets state of the other player is, lures me to assuming that I do have some definite and fixed, 
albeit unspecifiable, amount.  
Since I do not know the amount in my envelope, a more appropriate way to state the 
problem, accordingly, is from an acentric point of view. The acentric formulation of the problem is 
the following: Postulating that the total amount of money is fixed (since otherwise the paradox does 
not arise; see McGrew, Shier & Silverstein, 1997), there are two possible states of the world – (1) 
player A (who happens to be me) has X dollars and player B has 2X dollars, (2) player A has 2X 
dollars and player B has x dollars. These states are equally likely.  
In this formulation the uncertainty of any player with regard to her assets is the same as her 
uncertainty with regard to the other player’s assets: She does not really have a definite amount, Y. 
Rather, she either has X or 2X, and so does the other player. That subtle yet crucial change in 
framing dispels the paradox, since now if I agree to exchange, I will gain X dollars if I am in state 1, 
and lose X dollars if I am in state 2. The expected value of my gain from an exchange is, thus, 0, 
which invites indifference between the options. Given typical conservatism, players would hence 
tend to select the passive option – do not trade envelopes.  
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So, the customary formulation arouses some fallacy of reasoning2 that might elicit a futile 
behavior. Where does that fallacy come from? It must be due to some error in subjective framing, 
as many paradoxes are, but what kind of error?  
 
1.3 Source of the fallacy 
The fallacy described above is probably due in part to a disposition to view the world from 
an egocentric point of view, at least in the following epistemic sense: I know what I have; it is the 
state of the world outside me, or the intention of the other player, that I have uncertainty about.  
We tend to forget that our own state might also be part of the segment of reality which we 
are uncertain about. Hence, we read Y as a symbol standing for a definite amount, whose actual 
magnitude is immaterial for making our choice. The reason that amount is denoted by a symbol 
must be taken by us to be aimed just for seeking generality. That reasoning presumably causes 
Player A to gloss over the crucial point: That although the quantity denoted by Y is definite, the fact 
that it may be either twice as large or twice as small as what the other player has renders it 
indefinite from Player A’s point of view, which is utterly pertinent to her choice.  
That neglect leads Player A to misrepresent the problem as being much like an ordinary 
bet, namely a choice between the status-quo (remaining with a sure amount, Y, namely with a zero 
gain) on the one hand, and a mixture of two changes in assets that are unequal in both sign and 
magnitude, ∆1=2Y-Y= Y or ∆2=Y/2-Y= -Y/2, on the other hand. Consequently, the decision maker 
presumes the gain/loss ratio is known to be greater than 1, as it is in many bet situations.   
The crux of the fallacy is that it fails to take into account that in fact the status-quo itself is a 
mixture of two states of assets, X or 2X, and so is the status-quo of the other player. It is so, 
because for all the players know, the story is most plausibly the following: A fixed amount, Z (which 
equals 3X), has been divided in two - Z/3 (namely, X) and 2Z/3 (namely, 2X). Each of the players 
has even probabilities to have in her envelope either X or 2X. The magnitude of the difference 
between the states is thus known: |X|, hence actually the problem is a choice between the status-
quo and a mixture of two changes that differ only in sign, ∆1=2X-X= X or ∆2=X-2X= -X. The 
symmetry follows.3 
Another way of putting it is by comparing the expected value of one's own amount (0.5·Z/3 
+0.5·2Z/3 = Z/2) with the expected value of the other player's amount, which of course is exactly 
the same. Again, the symmetry follows.   
Note that the sample space is defined over the possible divisions of the overall amount, Z, 
not over the possible values of Z (for which the players seldom have any idea of, or very diffuse 
prior probabilities for at the best). Yet, the egocentric perspective regarding the exchange option as 
a mixture of two equally likely consequences, 2Y and Y/2  (where Y denotes the amount in one's 
own envelope), entails the latter sample space, since the above two consequences correspond to 
two possible values of Z: 3Y or 1.5Y.  
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The egocentric disposition is presumably enhanced when the player is permitted to know 
the exact amount in her envelope, namely that Y=$c where c is a known constant. However, the 
nature of the problem does not change just by knowing what Y amounts to. Knowing that does not 
add to the player any pertinent information, neither on the magnitude of Z nor on whether Y equals 
Z/3 or 2Z/3. What she does know is that both she and the other player have the same expected 
value for the amount in each one's own envelope (.5·Z/3 + .5·2Z/3 = Z/2). As that value differs 
equally (by |Z/3|) from each of the amounts in the two envelopes, the expected gain (namely, the 
difference between whatever amount one actually finds in her own envelope and the one expected 
to be in the other player's envelope) is zero4. Hence, there is no reason to opt for exchange. 
More generally, whenever two assets having unequal values, V1 and V2, are assigned at 
random to two persons, neither has any good reason to exchange assets, regardless of the 
magnitude of the ratio V1/V2. Rather, for what both players know, each is equally likely to gain |V1-
V2| or to lose |V1-V2|. Hence, the egocentric disposition must be fallacious, no matter what Z is and 
how it is divided, simply because it fails to admit the basic symmetry of the scenario. 
Presumably, the fallacy is manifested more often under certain framings or conditions. Still, 
the fact that it is observed at all indicates the existence of the egocentric disposition. Without such 
a disposition, respondents would not normally fail to notice the complete symmetry of the situation, 
which is quite glaring once one gets to realize it.       
The fallacy thus lies in people’s habitual perspective that, alas, proves to be wrong in the 
particular case. That is a common trap in paradoxical problems. Consider, for example, one well-
known instance of Zeno's paradoxes, Achilles and the Tortoise: Though Achilles is ten times faster 
than the tortoise, if the tortoise had an edge (say, of 10m), Achilles would never overtake him, 
since by each time Achilles arrives at the tortoise's previous position, the tortoise would have 
advanced 1m further.  
The lacuna in this logic is hard to spot, because the framing induces a perspective that 
makes us view this as a case of infinite regress – leading us to gloss over the simple truth that 
though a finite distance may be viewed as a sum of an infinite number of subdistances, it is still 
finite, hence traversable in finite time. 
 
1.4 Extensions 
Since that egocentric disposition is probably not restricted to this particular paradox, 
fallacies of this sort may be more prevalent than typically believed. It seems apt to denote them the 
extended exchange paradox. The phenomenon of noise trading may be a quintessential case. 
Another one may be the familiar phenomenon of queue switching (in the supermarket, on the road 
etc). Still another is the phenomenon of changing habits perceived as hazardous or beneficial to 
personal health.      
Note that the fallacy in and of itself does not necessarily lead to overswitching behavior, 
since it may be counteracted by other predilections (e.g., conservativeness, the status quo bias, 
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the endowment effect, loss aversion, concern about likely regret or disappointment). However, it 
clearly works to tip the scale toward switching.  
Let us examine the three illustrative instances mentioned above, speculative as they are for 
the time being.  
Life expectancy case.  Consider, for example, the effect of a certain treatment (or a certain 
food, or any other substance that one can electively take) T on residual life expectancy E. Suppose 
that present evidence is equivocal. Some findings suggest that T prolongs E by the factor5 R 
(R>1), while others suggest that it shortens E by the factor R. The balance of evidence leaves the 
two possibilities equally likely. Viewing the problem in this way does not result in any 
recommended conduct with respect to T. 
Consider a person A who does not at the present take T. She might reason like this: 
Presently, without T, I have some residual life expectancy E (though I do not know its exact value). 
If I opt for taking T, I might (with probability 0.5) prolong it to R·E, or (with the same probability) 
shorten it to E/R. The expected E is, thus, 0.5· (R-1/R) ·E, which is clearly greater than E.   
Now consider a person B who presently takes T. She might reason similarly: Presently, with 
T, I have some residual life expectancy E (though I do not know its exact value). If I opt for quitting 
T, I might (with probability 0.5) prolong it to R·E, or (with the same probability) shorten it to E/R. 
The expected E is, thus, 0.5· (R-1/R) ·E, which is greater than E. 
Clearly, if both A and B reason the same, hence get to exchange treatments, their 
reasoning represents a logical fallacy, even though one of them may turn out to make the right 
choice. Of course, not all people are switch seekers. Some may be even switch aversive. But it is 
doubtful that they do so for the right reason.   
Queue switching case.   Now consider the phenomenon of queue switching. Simple 
common sense suggests that one should not be tempted by an advance in another queue (unless 
it is an exceptionally significant one), because such events are expected to occur by chance (and 
sometimes be due to errors of perceptual judgment; see Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 1999, 2000). 
Most people must be aware that they are just gambling by opting for a switch (except when it is 
clear that they can immediately materialize its fruit, like when using a temporary free nearby space 
in the alternate lane of the road just to overtake a car or two previously driving ahead of them in 
their own lane). The reason they often do that nonetheless may be due to an assumption made 
about that gamble - one that also might follow from applying the fallacy arising from the egocentric 
disposition.  
The argument, explicit or tacit, presumably goes this way: If I am lucky, the rate of progress 
on the other queue will be faster than the rate on my present queue by a factor of R (say, 4 
queuers per minute rather than 2 per minute). If I am rather unlucky, the former will be slower than 
the latter by a factor of R (say, 1 per minute rather than 2 per minute). The gamble seems to have 
a positive value.6 Alas, it seems so from the perspective of any queue. It does not - to whoever 
does not wait in any of the queues.  
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Noise trading.    Another instance of switch seeking seems to be the phenomenon of "noise 
trading", the activity of people who use to trade stocks they hold, typically in a bullish manner, 
based on insufficient evidence.  
As noted above, noise traders must act on the premise that they would be better off 
switching to another stock, but the fact that they are often wrong indicates that they are driven by 
fallacious reasoning. A plausible candidate is the egocentric disposition.  
A moderately rational noise trader may reason, much like the typical queue switcher: Stock 
A that I presently have is probably going to yield a return Y. How about the alternative stock, B, 
recommended by my broker? Of course, I may either win or lose by trading A for B. Yet, if I am 
lucky, the return yielded by B will be R times greater than Y, and if I am rather unlucky, it will be R 
times smaller than Y. Since the deal seems to have a positive value, let me go for it.  
Actually, a similar line of reasoning could be made by present holders of B. But that, 
unfortunately, is glossed over by our noise trader.  
From experience, the noise trader may later learn the hard way that she has been wrong. If 
she does not attribute that to bad luck, she might grow to lose faith in her reasoning, then become 
more aversive to further engaging in such decisions (Ido Erev, personal communication). It is a 
long shot, though, that she would put the blame on decision rules she has been taught. However, 
that would probably have been the soundest conclusion.   
A moderating factor.    In all these instances, unlike in the envelopes problem, switch 
seeking must considerably depend on the extent to which it may be reasonably assumed that the 
dominant option in the present continues to dominate the alternate one in the immediate future. 
Yet, a considerable disposition to switch perhaps exists even when, just as in the envelopes 
problem, the person does not even know which is the dominant option at the present.7     
 
2. The present study 
 Empirically testing the presence of the extended exchange paradox in real-world situations 
calls for studying the prevalence of switching behavior. That in turn requires a paradigm in which 
decisions, akin to those being taken in some real-world situation, may be described as switching 
from, or staying at, some status-quo defined on a trial-by-trial basis. For that purpose, we studied 
how frequently participants tend to switch lanes in an experimental setting simulating the state of a 
driver on a two-lane, unidirectional road.  
An experimental support for the existence of a propensity to switch in the face of slim 
evidence for some merit from switching requires demonstrating dependence on variables that 
appear to be related to such evidence, to rule out mundane accounts (e.g., that participamts do it 
out of curiosity, boredom, or a bias in favor of probability matching in case of indifference). 
             We conducted an experiment to seek such support. Participants were not asked to actually 
drive. They were rather told that they would be able to watch their journey back home from work on 
a monitor screen as it proceeded. At any given trial, the participant watched her car traveling along 
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a 1-km segment of the way in one of the two lanes. Cars in each lane were moving at about the 
same speed, where the speed in one of the lanes was twice as fast as the speed in the other lane. 
Though speed assignement on each trial was totally random, the participant was not informed 
about that. At the end of each trial the participant selected the lane for the following trial by 
choosing whether or not to switch the lane her car was driving in. 
             Participants were encouraged to try minimizing travel time. A straightforward strategy that 
they could use in those circumstances, had they supposed that speed assignment was not 
perfectly random, may be termed Apparently-Rational Switch Strategy (ARSS for short): Switch 
following a "slower" trial; do not switch following a "faster" trial. We tested the hypothesis that 
participants tend to use that strategy, implicitly or explicitly, by studying how frequently lane 
switches were made, how switching behavior depended on traffic variables, how participants 
perceived switches, and whether the tendency to switch lanes related to held positions about the 
possible merit of switching. 
 
2.1 Method 
     2.1.1 Participants     
Ninety-eight undergraduate psychology students at the University of Haifa participated for 
course credit. A monetary performance-dependent prize to a single winner of a lottery was 
promised as well. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
     2.1.2 Apparatus and setting   
Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were controlled by an O2 SiliconGraphics 
computer. Stimuli were presented on the screen of a 22-inch computer display. The participant sat 
in front of the monitor at a viewing distance of about 60 cm. She responded by pressing on a 
designated keyboard key (the "Z" or the "/" keys) with the index finger of her dominant hand. 
      2.1.3 Stimuli, design and procedure      
Each participant was run individually in one experimental session that lasted about an hour. 
She was asked to imagine that she was driving from work to her home during heavy traffic in a 
one-way two-lane highway, and was told that she would be able to watch her journey on the 
monitor screen as it proceeded, as viewed from a camera that moved synchronically with her car. 
The display showed car icons (from a top view) "moving" on a limited stretch of that road. At any 
given moment, cars in each lane were moving at about the same speed, where the speed in one of 
the lanes was twice as fast as the speed in the other lane. The side of the faster lane (right, left) 
was randomly varied between trials. 
One of the cars, distinct from the other cars by color and size, was designated as the 
participant's car. It was suggested to her that she is expected to try to arrive home as early as 
possible (by mentioning that "since the route is fixed, the faster you travel, the earlier the 
experiment ends"), and could be rewarded (a monetary prize proportional to her speed of 
"reaching home", namely to the inverse of her travel time, in case she would win in a lottery 
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conducted after all participants were run). She had no direct control on the speed of her car, but 
could try to affect it indirectly by choosing the lane on which it would "move" in the following trial. 
She was also told that on each trial she would be watching the car traveling along a 1-km segment 
of the way, and that at its end she would have to decide whether or not to switch lanes during the 
following trial showing the subsequent segment.  
The cars displayed were heading toward the top of the screen. Yet, the participant's car 
was never seen moving up; it was rather stationary at the bottom of the screen, while the surround 
(marked by icons of electricity poles on the road margins) "moving" toward the bottom. All other 
cars within the same lane were also seen as basically stationary (except for slight jitters due to 
introduction of very small, random perturbations in either of the two directions - top and bottom). 
Cars in the other lane, in case they were visible (see below), were seen "moving" up when their 
speed was higher, or down when their speed was lower.   
The lanes appeared in the middle of a white rectangle (21 cm in height and 10 cm in width). 
Each lane's width was 2.5 cm. Cars "moved" at the middle of their lane. The cars measured 1.5 cm 
in height and 0.8 in width. They appeared in various colors (yellow, purple, gray, red, blue, green 
and azure). The participant's car was somewhat larger (1.8 cm in height and 0.8 cm in width) and 
black. It was invariably located at the bottom of the lane (with its back 4 mm above the bottom of 
the rectangular frame). The lanes were divided from each other by a black solid line. A red solid 
line was used to mark the margins of the lanes. The number of cars visible in each lane at any 
given trial was either 3 or 4. The icons of the electricity poles at the margins were drawn as circles 
(2 mm in diameter). The spacing between poles was 10.5 cm, so that at any given moment one or 
two poles were visible on each road margin. An illustrative display is presented in Figure 1.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
As noted above, in each trial the speed of cars in one of the lanes was twice as fast as in 
the other lane, where the side of the faster traffic was varied randomly. The sequence of actual 
speeds in the slower lane was determined by randomly sampling from a tripartite uniform 
distribution (with an overall range of 5-90 kmh, with probability of 0.1 for the subrange 5-15 kmh, 
probability of 0.7 for the subrange 16-45, probability of 0.2 for the subrange 46-90, yielding a mean 
of 30 kmh). The speed in the faster lane was twice as high (yielding a mean of 60 kmh). The length 
of a trial varied between 7.3 sec to 150 sec.  
On each trial except for the first one, the side of the participant's lane (right vs left) was 
determined by her response (switch or stay) following the immediately preceding trial. The 
participants were also given online feedback about the percentage of the total distance to home 
already travelled by the time, by means of a incrementally growing thin green stripe at the bottom 
of the screen. The full length of the stripe (at the end of the road) was 9.5 cm.  
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At the end of each trial, except for the last one, a notice was presented at the bottom of the 
screen, asking the participant whether she opted to switch lanes or to stay at the same lane on the 
subsequent trial. The participant were to react twice: First, make a quick decision (within 1 sec) 
indicating her gut, tentative intent; second, within 3 more sec, give her final, more deliberate 
decision. Responses were given by pressing on one of two designated keyboard keys. 
The number of trials in the experimental session was 70. The first ten ones were practice 
trials. In the first five practice trials, the participant was asked to just watch the traffic in the two 
lanes without responding. In the following five ones, participants were asked to also respond. The 
following 60 trials were considered as experimental, hence were analyzed. 
The 47th experimental trial was special, in that no cars (including the participant's car) were 
shown on the screen, and an announcement was displayed saying that the camera was 
temporarily out of order, but that the participant was supposed to respond despite that.  
The order of relative speeds over trials was manipulated between participants. Since the 
random assignment of relative speed to trials we initially used (on the first group of 63 participants), 
coupled with the response patterns of many participants, turned out to generate reinforcement of 
the ARSS strategy in more than half of the trials of the first half of the sequence (about 58.5%), but 
less than half of the trials (32%) - in the second half, we used another group (of 35 participants) for 
which the order of relative speeds over trials was reversed. Henceforth, that between-participant 
order variable (ARSS-encouraging vs ARSS-discouraging, respectively) is being referred to as trial 
history.  
            At the end of the session, following the last trial, participants were asked to fill out a pen-
and-paper questionnaire about how they perceived the task and their behavior while performing it 
(see Appendix A).  
 
 
2.2 Results 
The data of four participants were excluded for having a response percentage smaller than 
2/3. The data of all other ninety-four participants were analayzed. Mean response percentages and 
mean switch rates were calculated separately for immediate responses and for final responses, in 
both ordinary trials and the single no-feedback trial.  
Switch rates were considerably far from negligible. The 99 percent confidence limits for mean 
switch rate in final responses are 0.401- 0.467. The 99 percent confidence limits for mean switch rate 
in immediate responses are 0.415 – 0.492. That was pretty much the case in the no-feedback trial as 
well: The Agresti-Coull binomial proportion confidence limits for the proportion of participants who 
opted for switching in final responses are 0.238-0.511. The per-participant correlation between 
immediate and final responses was generally high, with a median of 1.0 (mean=0.916). All the 
following analyses are on final responses in ordinary trials.  
13 SWITCHING DUE TO EGOCENTRIC FRAMING     
 
  
             To examine whether participant behavior relates primarily to relative speed of traffic in her 
lane (twice or half of the speed in the other lane) or to the exact value of speed just in her lane, 
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated for each participant between (a) her response 
(switch=1, stay=0) and the speed of traffic in her lane on that trial, as well as between (b) her 
response and the sign of the ratio of that speed and the speed in the other lane (twice as fast, 
twice as slow).   
The overall percentage of participants (out of just those 65 ones who had both correlations 
negative) for whom the correlation between relative lane speed and response was higher than the 
correlation between actual speed and response was 89.2%. Percentages were not significantly 
affected by trial history, p=.39 by Fisher exact test. Thus, participants tended to switch predominantly 
following trials in which the traffic speed in the participant's lane was slower. 
         Mean correlations, as a function of trial history and correlation type, are presented in Table 1. 
Not surprisingly, in view of the results presented above, the mean correlation between response 
and actual speed was found significantly lower than the correlation between response and relative 
speed, F(1,92)=4.44, p<0.05, MSE=0.263. Yet, here the main effect of trial history was also 
significant, F(1,92)=39.74, p<0.0001, MSE=0.022, as was the interaction term, F(1,92)=8.61, 
p<.005, MSE=0.022.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
To obtain a more elaborate, fine-grained account of participants' switching behavior, we 
looked for further contingencies. Participant behavior could, of course, be arbitrary. Yet, several types 
of systematic patterns, or at least dispositions, might be anticipated.   
One conceivable pattern of participant behavior is state-indifferent perseverance, in turn 
branching in two possible subpatterns – one in which the participant almost always switches, the 
other in which she almost never switches, in both cases regardless of what the present state seems 
to be and of what her previous choice has been. If not due simply to low collaborativeness of 
participants with experimental requirements, the former (namely, almost always switch) might arise 
from compulsive switch seeking, and the latter (namely, almost never switch) – from apathetic/ 
fatalistic disposition. On the other hand, both could be moderately reasonable strategical choices, in 
case the participant somehow had reason to believe that there was no way to optimize behavior in 
view of the high uncertainty about the speed ratio. Indeed, given the random allocation of speeds in 
the design, the expected number of successes (trials in which the speed in the participant's lane is 
faster following her response) is the same in both strategies – very close to 50%.     
It is more interesting to examine patterns that indicate some contingency of response on 
present state or very recent history. Though no strategy could be better than another in this study, 
because speed allocation was administered totally at random, participants might have considered 
some strategies to be optimal as long as they did not realize the futility of that in view of the 
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randomness (which may be hard, since people tend to perceive illusory correlations; see Chapman, 
1967). 
We hypothesized that many participants would apply frequently, albeit perhaps not 
systematically, the strategy termed above ARSS (amounting to: Switch following a "slower-trial"; do 
not switch following a "faster-trial").  
Though it is not absolutely clear that participants explicitly, much less deliberately, used the 
ARSS strategy, the behavior of most of them suggests that they applied it, explicitly or implicitly, very 
often. To examine whether their behavior in that respect changed throughout the experiment, for the 
sake of the analysis we broke down the session in two subsessions – the first half, including trials 2-
29 (namely, excluding the first trial, behavior in which could not be related to any preceding events, 
which we do in some of the analyses reported below), and the second half, including trials 30-60 and 
excluding the no-feedback trial  and the subsequent one (numbers 47 and 48).  
The initial analysis was conducted using a three-way ANOVA on mean switch rates, 
calculated for each participant in each cell of a 3X2 factorial design, with trial history (ARSS-
encouraging, ARSS-discouraging), participant lane speed (faster, slower) and sub-session (first half, 
second half) as factors. The results are presented in Table 2A. The main effects of sub-session, as 
well as the history were not found significant, F(1,92)<0, and F(1,92)=3.00, p<0.09, MSE=0.054, 
respectively. On the other hand, the main effect of participant lane speed was found significant: Mean 
per-participant switch rate was found much larger in "slower" trials (0.620) than the corresponding 
mean in "faster" ones (0.226), F(1,92)=52.68, p<0.0001, MSE=0.203. The former was, furthermore, 
found to significantly exceed chance level, Binomial p=0.0105.  
The dual interaction between participant lane speed and trial history was found significant, 
F(1,92)=6.47, p<0.01, MSE=0.203. The effect of participant lane speed seems to be more salient in 
the ARSS encouraging condition. No other interaction was found significant or close to significance. 
   
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
  ---------------------------------- 
Inspecting the list of observed per-participant rates in all experiments, four types of 
participants were discerned: (a) ARSS devout followers – those who manifested ARSS-compatible 
behavior in each trial, (b) ARSS preferrers – those who manifested ARSS-compatible behavior in at 
least 90% of the trials, but not in each, (c) Stay preferrers – those who opted for staying in at least 
90% of the trials, (d) Others. The numbers of participants in this experiment falling into each of those 
types were 16, 13, 1 and 64.  
Thus, almost a third of the participants were predominantly or entirely consistent in following 
ARSS. Almost all the rest (categorized above as type d) were less consistent, but on the whole they 
fairly often switched, and in addition manifested behavior that was compatible with ARSS more 
frequently than ARSS-incompatible behavior. As can be seen in Table 2B, across those other 
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participants, the mean per-participant rate was higher in "slower" trials than in "faster" trials. The 
ANOVA conducted only on the data of those participants yielded a significant main effect of 
participant lane speed F(1,62)=10.94, p<0.001, MSE=0.094. No other main effect or interaction was 
found significant or even close to significance 
Switch rates and their complements may be reframed as rates of ARSS-compatible 
responses. Table 3A presents those rates for all participants; Table 3B presents them for just the 64 
"other" participants. In an ANOVA conducted on the rates in the former table, significant main effect of 
participant lane speed was found, F(1,92)=41.33, p=0.0001, MSE =0.054. The main effect of history 
was also found significant, F(1,92)=6.47, p=0.01, MSE =0.203. The interaction between history and 
participant lane speed was close to significance, F(1,92)=3.00, p=0.09, MSE =0.054. No other main 
effect or interaction was found significant or close to significance. In the ANOVA conducted on the 
rates in the latter table, significant main effect of participant lane speed was found, F(1,62)=52.41, 
p=0.0001, MSE =0.058. No other main effect or interaction was found significant or close to 
significance. 
Thus, it appears that participants tend to stay in the faster lane more than they tend to switch 
from the slower one. 
---------------------------------- 
 Insert Table 3 about here 
                                                       ---------------------------------- 
    To examine whether there were sequential dependencies between consecutive trials in data 
obtained from participants whose behavior did not seem to be determined by a single or predominant 
strategy, namely the 64 "other" participants, we conducted two further three-way ANOVAs on mean 
switch rates of those participants.  
In the first one, the three factors were history, participant lane speed in trial i (namely, the one 
at the end of which the participant made the response) and participant's behavior in trial i-1(switch, 
stay). Whereas participant lane speed in trial i was, consistent with the above analyses, found to have 
such an effect, F(1,62)=11.00, p<0.002, MSE=0.162, and the effect of behavior in trial i-1 was also 
significant, F(1,62)=10.68, p=0.002, MSE =0.088, the pairwise interaction was not found significant 
(F<1), which indicates that there was no discernible sequential dependency: Participants' behavior 
was unaffected by success in the recent trial. The main effect of history as well its interactions with 
the other variables were not found significant (F<1). 
In the second ANOVA, the three factors were history, participant lane speed in trial i and 
ARSS-compatibility of participant's behavior in trial i-1 (compatible, incompatible). Whereas participant 
lane speed in trial i was found, as in the preceding ANOVA, to have such an effect, neither the main 
effect of ARSS-compatibility in trial i-1 was found significant, F(1,62)=2.00, p=0.17, MSE=0.060, nor 
was the pairwise interaction, F(1,62)=1.87, p=0.18, MSE=0.100. The main effect of history as well its 
interactions with the other variables were not found significant or close to significance. Again, there 
was no discernible sequential dependency. 
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On the other hand, it could well be that there were higher-level dependencies: Though 
behavior did not seem to change much over the trial sequence, participants might have been 
instrumentally conditioned in early trials to later favor or retract some response strategy. To further 
examine whether or not participants were in any way influenced by experience during previous trials, 
mean per-participant stay rates in "faster" trials, mean per-participant switch rates in "slower" trials, as 
well as mean per-participant rates of ARSS-compatible responses, across all trials in the second half, 
were correlated with per-participant mean differential reinforcement rates of the two possible modes 
of participant's behavior (ARSS-compatible, ARSS-incompatible) in the two types of participant lane 
speed (faster, slower) across all trials in the first half.  
The results presented in Table 4A indicate a salient effect of history. In the ARSS-encouraging 
condition, we found a fair amount of dependence between the participant behavior and her previous-
trials experience. However, across participants most such individual influence effects were cancelled 
out, resulting in no significant effect of sub-session. ARSS-compatibility did not increase in the second 
half (and actually appeared to have somewhat decreased; see Table 3 above). That could not have 
been due to paucity of trials in which ARSS-compatible behavior was reinforced (by landing on the 
faster lane), because the percentage of such trials was about 50%. It is more likely to rather reflect 
some frustration of participants who expected, or at least hoped, that following ARSS would gain them 
a higher rate of success.  
---------------------------------- 
 Insert Table 4 about here 
                                                       ---------------------------------- 
The pattern in the ARSS-discouraging condition was different. The results indicate no 
significant dependence between the participant behavior and her previous-trials experience. The 
reason, as it seems on closely examining participants' behavior, is probably that scarce reinforcement 
of ARSS (on the average, 27% of the relevant trials in the first half of the session) was not sufficient 
for deterring quite a few participants from continuing to frequently follow it.  
To illustrate, one participant followed ARSS in 100% of the trials at the second half of the 
session despite having been reinforced only in 30% (8 out of 27) of his ARSS-compatible trials in the 
first half. Another one followed ARSS in 67% of the trials at the second half despite having been 
reinforced only in 9% (1 out of 11) of his ARSS-compatible trials, but as much as 50% (7 out of 14) of 
his ARSS-incompatible trials in the first half. That extreme disregard of consequences must have 
been mediated by some wrong intuitive reasoning, since it is incompatible with theories of implicit 
conditioning (see, e.g., Kileen, 1994). Such participants may have been attributing their lack of 
success to bad luck. Ironically, though they were right about that, unfortunately that served as a 
rationalization helping them to hang on to overtrusting the illusion that the ARSS strategy must be a 
reasonable bet.  
 Since no significant learning in the ARSS-discouraging condition was observed, the six 
correlations were compared to the same correlations in the ARSS-encouraging condition. Four of 
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them (except for the two between percent trial in "faster" and "slower" trials in trials 30-60 and 
between differential reinforcement rate in trials 1-29 in which speed in participant's lane is faster) were 
found significantly larger (with p<.05 at least in a two-tailed Z test) in the ARSS-encouraging 
condition.  
This difference could be due to the small rate of consistent following of ARSS in the ARSS-
discouraging condition at the start, that probably acted to avert considerable negative feedback, which 
in contrast many participants in the ARSS-encouraging condition did receive. Such a paucity of 
consistent data about contingency may result in opting for random choice (see Erev & Barron, 2005). 
Alternatively, it may be more plausibly due to behavior that persists irrespective of apparent success. 
It seems that positive feedback for ARSS stregthened it considerably more that negative feedback 
weakened it. This suggests that participants may have misperceived the situation, entertained some 
overoptimistic idea about the best way to deal with it, or perhaps both.  
In any case, when the correlations were calculated across those two conditions (see Table 4B) 
that differed just on the order of assignment of relative speed to trials, all six correlations were found 
to be highly significant.  
To compare within-session trends in following ARSS in both history conditions, we calculated 
cumulative ARSS-compatible rates, by trial 12, trial 30 and trial 60. The cumulative rates in the ARSS-
discouraging condition were 0.660, 0.605 and 0.608, respectively. It is not at all clear that the smaller 
ARSS-compatible rate there is due in any way to the extent of learning from previous trials 
experience, since the rate decreased no less in the ARSS-encouraging condition 4 - 0.764, 0.744 and 
0.728, respectively. 
In sum, the main features of the results - considerable mean switch rate, high mean ARSS-
compatible rate, as well as the dependence of both on participant lane speed – were demonstrated in 
both groups. This suggests that switching behavior is fairly robust and not highly sensitive to 
reinforcement history.  
 
 RT analyses   
Two one-way analyses, GLM (due to the presence of missing cells) for immediate responses 
and ANOVA for final responses, were conducted to compare mean RTs for the two possible 
responses (switch vs stay), in each of the two immediacy levels.  
Interestingly, mean RT of switch responses was found significantly smaller than mean RT of 
stay responses in both levels. In immediate responses, the means were 619 ms and 651 ms, 
respectively; F(1,92)=43.70, p<0.0001, MSE=1160. In final responses the means were 2487 ms and 
2520 ms, respectively; F(1,28)=8.34, p<0.01, MSE=2016. It thus seems, that switches was in a way 
the default option, presumably because participants were inherently disposed to choose it.  
In passing, the practically-equal effect sizes, coupled with the very high correlation between 
immediate and final levels, suggest that the final response was in the great majority of cases just a 
delayed replica of the immediate response, and were not preceded by plenty of second thoughts.  
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 Questionnaire data  
         Participants' replies about their own frequencies of switching (first two questions) indicate that 
they were fairly well aware of their behavior: The mean self-estimated number of switches of those 
participants who reported of having switched frequently was 26.82, significantly more than 13.48, the 
corresponding mean of participants who reported of not having switched frequently, F(1,64)=18.36, 
p<0.0001, MSE=157.65. The objective means of number of switches for those two participant types, 
27.44 and 22.02 respectively, were also significantly different, F(1,80)=12.41, p<0.001, MSE=47.58. 
 A large majority of participants (77.4%) reported of being able to describe the characteristics 
of the state in which they had opted for switch. The verbal replies (of 73 participants whose phrasing 
was clear enough) about that, together with the arguments pertinent to switching, were sorted by us in 
four categories – (a) absolute: traffic in participant's lane seemed slow, (b) relative: traffic in 
participant's lane was slower than in the alternate lane, (c) history: the participant was applying 
lessons from previous trials, (d) other: a variety of reasons that do not fall in the former three 
categories. The corresponding frequencies were 5, 44, 5 and 19, respectively.  
 Mean number of switches was found to significantly differ among the participant types defined 
by those four categories, F(3,69)=2.72, p=0.05, MSE=44.11, where the only significant difference 
between specific types is that between "absolute" and "history".  A significant effect of participant 
types was found also with respect to mean ARSS-compatible rates, F(3,69)=5.51, p=0.002, 
MSE=0.049. Here, "relative" significantly differ from "absolute". In addition, those categories were 
found to be associated with our typology of participants' strategies: Out of the 24 participants whose 
behavior seemed to follow ARSS at least in 90% of the trials, 92% gave a reply categorized as 
"relative"; out of the 49 participants whose behavior was typed as "other", only 45% gave that reply, 
χ
2
= 14.72, p<.0001. Accordingly, it seems plausible that at least half of the participants were led to 
frequently follow ARSS, because it appeared to them a promising way to land often on the faster lane.    
 Out of 90 participants who responded to the two questions about the envelopes problem, 77 
replied twice that they would not exchange envelopes. Out of the 13 others, six replied twice that they 
would exchange envelopes, five replied so only to the post-argument question (apparently having 
been persuaded by the argument), and the remaining two replied so only to the pre-argument 
question.  
 Interestingly, out of the 13 participants who at least once replied that they would opt for 
exchanging envelopes, 54% (namely, seven) followed ARSS at least in 90% of the trials, a 
percentage that is much higher than the corresponding percentage among all other 77 participants – 
26%, χ2=4.11, p<.05.  
 
3. General Discussion 
          A major finding of this study is that many participants, far more than a small minority, switched 
lanes frequently, despite having no objectively sound reason for doing that. Another major finding is 
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that they did that substantially more in trials in which they found themselves in the lane in which traffic 
was moving more slowly, which suggests that they were trying to do the best they could, in their view, 
to meet the goal implied in the instructions. A number of them appeared to follow the ARSS strategy, 
prescribing switching in such trials and only in them. Some other participants appeared to have also 
practiced that strategy, yet less systematically.  
 It goes without saying that no strategy was really optimal. Indeed, participants who 
predominantly or entirely followed ARSS actually achieved a rate of success (namely, landing on the 
faster lane following the response) that was practically the same as the mean success rate of other 
participants (47.6% vs  47.3%, respectively, F<1).  
     Explaining participants' behavior is far from straightforward. Despite the paucity of information 
participants could rely on at the start to figure out how to optimize their chance to “reach home” as 
soon as possible, they were explicitly told in the instructions, and anyway must have become pretty 
early aware of the basic symmetry between lanes, as well as of their own uncertainty whether a 
switch would get their car into a lane that was twice as fast or twice as slow as the lane they were in 
at the time. Furthermore, since lane speeds were determined randomly, the objective rate of positive 
feedback the participants received was not very high. Thus, they had no good reason to suppose that 
since switching was an offered option, it must have been a smart move to apply.    
This is also true of participants who adopted a fixed strategy, notably ARSS. For those 
participants, their strategy dictated a rate of positive feedback very close to chance level across all 
trials (actually, it turned out slightly less). Hence, at least as they have acquired some experience, 
they should have been realizing that the distribution of lane speeds over trials was not determined in 
any nonrandom pattern (e.g., a systematically faster lane, a simple alternation rule) that they could 
count on, and that even if there was occasionally a temporarily faster one for a run of a few trials, their 
chance of landing on it again was meager. In view of that, despite the well-known human handicaps in 
correctly perceiving randomness (e.g., Kubovy & Gilden, 1990; Lopes & Oden, 1987; Nickerson, 
2002; though strong correlations are detected relatively fast, see Kareev, 2000), they must have not 
developed high expectations about discovering a heuristic, much less a formula, for beating the 
system. Judging by the questionnaire data, nobody did.    
           The behavior of most participants was, nonetheless, sensitive mostly to a trial-specific stimulus 
- lane speed. In that respect, it resembled behavior of participants in some other paradigms involving 
more artificial tasks, such as gambling which of two boxes contained a reward (Avrahami & Kareev, 
2011). On the other hand, unlike participants in the latter study (in which decisions were not referred 
to the status quo, and one alternative was preferrable in the long run), behavior of participants in the 
present study was not affected by the success of their choice in the most recent trial. No sign of 
interaction between participant lane speed in trial i and participant's behavior in trial i-1 was 
discerned. Rather, our participants typically based their choice simply on lane speed in trial i.  
Thus, despite likely skepticism about the chance of discovering a useful heuristic, most 
participants must have been surmising (or implicitly been driven to act as if they were surmising) quite 
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frequently that somehow they had more to gain than to lose from a switch following a "slower" trial. 
The big question is why they felt that way. 
The case for adopting the ARSS strategy presumes some extent of short-term stationarity of 
lane speed beyond that expected from a basically random process (which is, of course, a likelihood of 
0.5 for getting the same relative lane speed as before), reminiscent of the belief in "hot hand" runs, 
prevalently biasing perception of sequence randomness (see, e.g., Gilovich, Vallone & Tversky, 
1985). Yet, whereas it seems a-priori reasonable to surmise that "hot hand" accounts for some 
variance in psychomotor behavior, as an hypothesis about disparate random sequences, whose 
generating process is unknown, it is not less arbitrary than the converse hypothesis - alternation bias. 
Since participants were not provided in the instructions any clue that the process was not random, but 
most of them (actually, all but one) tended to prefer ARSS from the start, they must have been drawn 
to that preference by making a wrong guess about the purpose and design of the experiment and/or 
by importing their existing model of road behavior on the highway.  
True, participants' predispositions at the outset were somewhat changed later by apparent 
contingencies generated by perceived deviation of the subsequence at the start of the session from 
their imaged model of perfect randomness. Yet, the mean rate of ARSS-compatible responses 
exceeded chance level even when experience has not seemed to reinforce it. Ironically, lack of 
reinforcement appeared to have somewhat lowered adherence to ARSS in "faster" trials. That was 
presumably due to a tendency to opt for switching that was fairly strong regardless of whatever might 
have been learned from previous trials: Mean switch rate across all participants in the ARSS-
discouraging group was 0.393, just slightly smaller than in it was in the ARSS-encouraging one – 
0.438.   
Furthermore, switching was found to be opted for even in the face of full uncertainty: The 
appeal to switch was considerable (mean switch rate of 0.390) also in a control experiment that we 
conducted (not reported here), in which participants were not shown the traffic in the other lane. Even 
in the no-feedback trial reported above, in which no speed information at all was available to the 
participant, mean switch rate was almost as high as it was in ordinary trials, 0.5 for participants who 
mostly or entirely followed ARSS, and 0.316 for participants in the "others" category. This seems fairly 
consistent with the percent of respondents prefiguring they would switch queues in the supermarket 
(see Footnote 7).  
Thus, presuming short-term stationarity was not found to be a necessary condition for 
switching. Actually, it could neither have been a sufficient condition: Assuming that lane speeds on 
trial i+1 are somewhat more likely to remain as they were on trial i than to change does not, of course, 
eliminate the risk that they do change. The aversion to such risks very often gives rise to a bias 
favoring the status quo. It, thus, appears that there must have been some other reason for being 
tempted to switch.      
That the option of switch had a pre-rational appeal receives some support from the finding that 
mean reaction time of switch responses was significantly lower than the corresponding mean in stay 
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responses, in immediate and final responses alike. Conceivably, a decision to stay took some extra 
time, perhaps required to counteract the spontaneous impetus to switch. Unlike in real road driving, in 
which that impetus is often restrained by caution since the loss is most often considerable (and there 
is some small increase in risk of accident from switching into another lane), in the artificial 
environment of this experiment the loss must have appeared trivial, so that the impetus to switch 
could be more openly manifested. This seems to be a virtue of the design, since the issue is how 
strong that impetus is, not how frequently it actually triggers switching (and not just in highway driving, 
which is after all just one of the possible arenas in which switching is considered).   
All that lends some support to the hypothesis, that people, at least some people, often seek 
switching in default of any subjective evidence for stationarity and sometimes even in the face of 
cumulating evidence for the contrary. It seems that anyhow the crucial consideration is not any 
illusory belief about beating uncertainty. To illustrate, even when a basketball coach tends to attribute 
a run of missed shots by a shooting guard to a "cold hand", he must know full well that there is no 
guarantee that the player sent in to replace the unluck one would fare better. If he nonetheless opts 
for replacing the "cold-handed" guard, he must probably believe that there is more to gain than to lose 
from doing that. That must be a-fortiori true in case there is no apparent evidence for stationarity. 
People may, thus, find switching attractive for some reason that transcends whatever evidence they 
might have, or its lack thereoff, about uncertainty.  
What is that reason? It is all too easy to ascribe that preference to a long history of 
reinforcements. As argued above, it is not at all clear that switching behavior could in general be truly 
beneficial.  
In any case, the answers to the questionairre items suggest that most of our participants were 
not acting instinctively, much less whimsically. Rather, they were presumably giving some thought to 
the problem, even those ones who did not end up locked on a single strategy. Granted, their solutions 
must have been far less than articulated. So is, however, most of human informal decision making. 
That does not daunt students of behavior from inferring the existence of implicit rationales (SEU, for 
one) underlying the behavior in question.  
 
So, is a propensity to switch actually supported by the data?  
 One might contend that the existence of a tendency to seek switching has not been 
substantiated here, since the overall mean switch rate was found to be less than 0.5 (surmised to 
be chance level). Alas, there are two faults in that argument. 
 The first one is that it seems to ignore a very plausible possibility: Like any other tendency, 
switch seeking may not be general across people, neither non-circumstantial. In the Introduction 
we suggest that switch seeking is a trait rather than a universal phenomenon. It is quite possible, 
even likely, that while many people normally avoid switching, perhaps due to the status quo bias 
(possibly enhanced, in the case of road driving, by the small risk in lane switching), some others 
are habitual (even persistent) switch seekers, and yet others are occasional (presumably 
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circumstantial) switch seekers. In this experiment, 31% were found to be quite consistent switch 
seekers. Hence, mean switch rate across all participants is anyhow not expected, much less 
predicted, to exceed chance level.  
A more fatal fault in that argument is that it posits chance level switch rate to be 0.5 across 
all trials. Yet, the hypothesis being tested here is obviously not that switch seeking is committed 
out of compulsion irrespective of circumstances. We conjecture that even habitual switch seekers 
mostly do not crave switching quite irrationally, but are rather guided by some pseudo-rational 
argument, conscious or preconscious, leading them to frequently opt for switching. Furthermore, 
they do not do that always, only whenever they feel for some reason that their state could have 
been better off. In the reported experiment, for example, ARSS followers switched lanes only or 
mostly following a trial in which they found themselves in a lane in which traffic was relatively slow 
(which they probably anticipated to persist to the subsequent trial). The figure pertinent to our 
hypothesis is, thus, their mean rate of switching in that state. It was found to be 0.99 for ARSS 
followers across both kinds (devout followers and preferrers). Furthermore, even participants 
having no discerned behavior pattern opted to switch significantly more often after being in the 
slower lane. Across all participants, the mean rate of switching in that condition was 0.62, 
significantly higher than 0.5. 
Thus, it seems plausible that many people have a considerable tendency towards switch 
seeking, and others are tempted to switch occasionally when that strategy appears to them apt.  
 
Were participants manifesting the egocentric disposition? 
In the present case, the implicit rationale for surmising that there is more to gain than to lose 
from switching could be the false notion that the gain is literally greater, due to a pseudo-rational 
argument of the sort shown above to follow from the extended exchange paradox, emanating in turn 
from the egocentric disposition. A participant need not be acquainted with SEU or any other formal 
decision model to have tacitly reasoned in about the following manner: If I am lucky, the speed in the 
other lane is going to be in the next trial faster than the speed in my present lane by a factor of 2. If I 
am rather unlucky, the former will be slower than the latter by a factor of 2. So, supposing  the 
forthcoming speed in my present lane is S0, the speed in the other lane is going to be either 2S0 or 
.5S0. Since |2S0-S0| > |.5S0-S0|, this must be a risk worth taking.  
As we pointed out in the Introduction section, people may behave as if they are implicitly 
guided by such a rationale without having explicitly considered it as such, much less having 
deliberately used it as an apparently reasonable basis for opting to switch, let alone having plainly 
calculated the expected gain. The mistaken intuition that there is twice as much to gain from switching 
than there is to lose may suffice. Yet, the supposition that "twice as fast" buys one more than what 
she could lose in "twice as slow" is not only wrong mathematically, predicating that the objective is to 
minimize travel time rather than maximize one’s rate of progress (see Footnote 6). Its main fault is 
that it is logically fallacious.    
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As argued above, the fallacy results from thinking solely in terms of gains and losses. Gains 
and losses are defined with respect to a given status quo or to some other reference point. Actually, 
however, when the participant is to make her choice of lane for the subsequent trial, i+1, she does not 
have any subsequent-trial-pertinent reference point. Though she might somehow take into account, or 
be otherwise affected by, her speed in trial i (to the extent that she assumes short-lived stationarity), 
that speed is irrelevant, because she cannot have any idea how faster or how slower could her speed 
in trial i+1 be. All she does know about the subsequent trial is that like in any other trial, the speed in 
one of the lanes is going to be twice as large as the speed in the other lane. If she happened to end 
up in the former, she would obviously move twice as fast as she would have had she ended up in the 
latter. If she rather happened to end up in the latter, she would move twice as slow as she would have 
had she ended up in the former. Those are not two separate reference-point-oriented outcomes, as 
gain and loss must be, but rather two possible-outcome-oriented framings. 
The finding that switching was more frequent in "slower" trials suggests that participants 
presumed some level of stationarity. Yet, the finding that it was exhibited quite often in "faster" trials 
as well (especially by "other" participants), or in no-feedback trials, supports the claim that they were 
guided by the argument following from the extended exchange paradox.   
The error in hoping to gain from lane switching should be evident, perhaps even glaring, to 
any reader at this point. But is it as evident to a person naïve about the problem, skilled as she may 
be in normative decision making?  
Interestingly, the same fallacy would be manifested in the envelopes problem, if the customary 
maximizing-expected-gain rule were applied to it from the viewpoint of egocentric framing. It has not 
been demonstrated that people are actually likely to commit the fallacy-originated decision when 
presented with the envelopes problem in its classic form (4 out of 30 participants in Butler & 
Nickerson, 2008, Exp 1, Game 6; 8 out of 90 - in the questionnaire data we collected). They must be 
counting on their intuition in that case more than on maximizing-expected-gain reasoning, even when 
they are moderately versed in applying it. Perhaps it helps that in that form of the problem there is no 
seeming clue that the person holding the other envelope may be better off.  
The case may be different in situations involving choice between queues. Gambling on 
switching queues in a supermarket, a more mundane dilemma, perhaps seems more attractive. So 
may be the case of switching lanes on the road when the traffic on the driver's road moves slowly. 
Note, unlike the envelopes problem, which calls for a one-shot decision (as are many other 
problems in experimental decision making) in a completely symmetric, information-impoverished 
state, behavior facing real-world switching dilemmas may differ, in part because they considerably 
depend, for better or worse, on experience with repeated decisions, at least more than they do on 
considerations such as loss aversion (see Erev, Ert & Yechiam, 2008; Rakow & Newell, 2010; cf 
Erev et al, 2010): People appear to follow a heuristic subjectively perceived consonant with what 
they might reason from experience. This seems to be the behavior of participants in the study 
reported here.  
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Even more cogently, facing a challenge to perform especially well, as well as a chance to mold 
on the fly a strategy that apparently could be tested against continual feedback, many participants in 
this study were tempted to better their lot by switching frequently when they found themselves in the 
slower moving lane. People presumably do not do it that often in real-world situations, but that may be 
due more to inherent costs (for one, risk of collision, likelihood of being stopped by police on charge of 
dangerous weaving) than to discretion and sober judgment.8  
Thus, switch seeking may be fairly prevalent, quite probably more than commonly assumed, 
typically when the person perceives her state as worse than the alternative one, and believes, often 
erroneusly, to have some clue that it would continue to be worse if she did not switch.  
How general could these findings be? Evidently, they have been observed in an experimental 
situation, furthermore one in which the task was to optimize performance in a particular decision 
problem in which stakes were not high. On the other hand, that task was meant to simulate an 
everyday activity in which switching behavior seems to be fairly common. It is, thus, not far-fetched 
that the task does represent fairly well a mundane problem, and the findings do demonstrate a 
tendency that is considerably potent in real life.  
Another interesting question is whether individuals who frequently switch lanes on the road or 
trade their stocks for other ones are more inclined to also seek more significant changes in life (such 
as changing working places, occupations, spouses). Answering that surely requires much further 
research.   
   
Implications for normative decision making 
             Is decision making behavior, in the illustrative instance presented above or in others, really 
determined by reasoning of the type hypothesized here?  
People who appear to follow a rule of behavior clearly do not have to be aware of following it, 
let alone to have deliberately formed it. If people do use the kind of reasoning we hypothesize they 
do, it must be by and large in a pre-rational stage, presumably by what is now customarily called 
system-1 (see Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000).  
Anyhow, the pitfall is surely there. The mere possibility that people sometimes fall in it, or even 
just tempted by it, calls for some rethinking not only of the intuitions underlying much of human real-
world decision making, but also of the normative rule of indiscriminately choosing between options by 
expected gain or expected utility (or by any other egocentric decision rule; e.g., choosing by median 
squared gain or by maximal gain) in the way typically prescribed.  
The pitfall seems to be due to a fundamental conceptual habit: Postulating that (a) by default 
one's own state is given9, (b) her uncertainty is due just to the state of the outside world, (c) her 
decisions must strive to maximize some function of her possible outcomes (e.g., gains) in view of that 
uncertainty.  
Though maximizing expected gain (or expected utility) is surely quite sensible in the case that 
customary postulation is valid, the problem is that uncertainty may sometimes apply to one's own 
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state no less than to the world's state. For example, when one rides a slow bus, she may consider 
switching to another one based on what she perceives is the former's present rate of progress and 
what she estimates (or fancies) is the latter's rate of progress.  
She rarely tries to rather formulate the problem at the outset from a less egocentric angle: 
Given that there are two buses with different rates of progress, what is the chance that I am on the 
faster moving one right now? Do I have at all any pertinent data to decide that? In case I do not have 
such data (say, because the other bus is not in sight), for what I know I am equally likely to be riding 
now the faster moving bus as I am to be riding the slower moving one. Hence, unless I somehow 
obtain data sufficient to tip the balance between the horns of my dilemma, I might as well stick with 
the status quo.   
Thus, a key factor in motivating a switch of the sort studied here may be the egocentric 
disposition. Granted, in numerous states egocentric framing is as reasonable as can be. The trouble 
is that in some other cases it drives people to seemingly maximize expected gains even when no 
base reference point exists. The distinctive feature of such a case seems to be that the values carried 
by the two alternatives at decision time are either unknown or totally unpredictive of the future.  
To dissuade people from behaving in that way in such cases, it seems advisable to practice 
acentric framing. That requires some sort of elective dissociation. A way to avoid egocentric errors of 
the kind discussed above is to exercise just that, elective dissociation, namely to try viewing any 
situation from an outside perspective: "There are players; I better start by alienatedly calling them A 
and B; then let us assume that A happens to be me. What I should do is what A should have done 
from the alienated, outside perspective. Yet, from that perspective, A should not do anything different 
than B does".  
That seems quite different from maximizing expected value (or for that matter, any other 
positive function) of gains as if the worth of one's state (portfolio, health, time-to-exit-a-queue, job, 
career) was definite.  
Thus, the time-honored, normative rule of deciding between options by expected monetary 
value of possible outcomes (Bernoulli, 1954/1738), or by subjective expected utility (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944; cf earlier concepts of utility such as Gabriel Cramer's "moral expectation" concept 
discussed in  Bernoulli, 1954/1738, or the one proposed by Jevons, 1965/1871), may be less 
universally adequate than customarily postulated. A caveat is called for: The rule should not be 
applied uncritically, rather only when amounts of gains and losses were either explicitly known or 
calculable from other data (e.g., the ratio between a consequence state and a known status-quo 
state).  
One might ponder how frequently the latter condition is met. A tacit assumption underlying that 
rule is that humans aspire to maximize gains (typically, the subjective values of gains), namely 
increases with respect to the status-quo, or to some other reference point, whatever it might be. It is 
well established that in many cases, persumably most cases, they do so (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), but it is still hard to repudiate the stance that they would sometimes do better to maximize their 
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total assets (in the broad sense, including not just property but also health, job, etc), and typically the 
subjective utility of total assets. There is some evidence that they sometimes tend to do that 
(Kahneman, 2003). Yet, how often do people definitely know both their status-quo state of assets and 
their utility function in personal assets? Very rarely, so it seems, as Jevons (1965/1871) noted almost 
a century-and-a-half ago (ibid, p. 52).  
And even in the case that people maximize subjective value of outcomes, how often do people 
definitely know those values? They probably do take some subjective magnitudes regularly into 
account in some implicit computation that their brain does while weighing alternatives intuitively, but 
can they normally retrieve them to be explicitly considered when they are to apply a normative rule in 
a deliberate fashion as sometimes required?  
 It, thus, seems that we often make decisions in a fuzzier state of knowledge than we typically 
realize. In that case, trying the alienated, acentric heuristic suggested above may be advisable. 
27 SWITCHING DUE TO EGOCENTRIC FRAMING     
 
  
References 
 
Arkes, H.R., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and 
     Human Decision Processes, 35, 124-140. 
Avrahami, J., & Kareev, Y. (2011). The role of impulses in shaping decisions. Journal of Behavioral 
     Decision Making, 24, 515-529. 
Bell, D. E. (1982). Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 30, 961-981.  
Bell, D. E. (1988). Diappointment in decision making under uncertainty. In D.E. Bell, H. Raiffa and A. 
     Tversky. (Eds.) Decision Making: Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions (pp. 358- 
     383). Cambridge: Cambrifge University Press.  
Bernoulli, D. (1954). Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk. Econometrica,  
     22, 23-36. (Translated from Italian; originally published as "Specimen theoriae novae de mensura 
     sortis" in 1738). 
Brams, S., & Kilgour, D. (1995). The box problem: To switch or not to switch.  
     Mathematics Magazine, 68(1), 27-34.  
Butler, S.F., & Nickerson, R.S. (2008). Keep or trade? An experimental study of the exchange 
     paradox. Thinking and Reasoning, 14, 365-394. 
Chapman, L.J. (1967). Illusory correlation in observational report. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
     Verbal Behavior, 6, 151-155. 
Christensen, R. & Utts, J. (1992). Bayesian resolution of the “exchange paradox".  
     The American Statistician, 46, 274-276.  
Erev, I., & Barron, G. (2005). On adaptation, maximization, and reinforcement learning among 
      cognitive strategies. Psychological Review, 112, 912-931. 
Erev, I., Ert, E., & Yechiam, E. (2008). Loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity, and the effect of  
      experience on repeated decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 21, 575-597. 
Erev, I., Ert, E., Roth, A.E., Haruvy, E., Herzog, S.M., Hau, R., Hertwig, R., Stewart, T., West, R., & 
     Leibiere, C. (2010). Choice prediction competition: Choices from experience and from  
     Description. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 15–47.  
Fishburn, P.C. (1983). Transitive measurable utility. Journal of Economic Theory, 31,  
      293-317.  
Garland, H. (1990). Throwing good money after bad: The effect of sunk costs on the decision to 
      escalate commitment to an ongoing project. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 728-731. 
Gilovich, T. (1991). How we know what isn't so: The fallibility of human reason in 
     everyday life. New York: free Press. 
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: On the misperception of 
     random sequences. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 295-314.  
Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (Eds.) (2002). Heuristics and biases. New 
     York: Cambridge University Press.  
28 SWITCHING DUE TO EGOCENTRIC FRAMING     
 
  
Granberg, D., & Brown (1995). The Monty Hall dilemma. Personality and Social Psychology 
     Bulletin, 21, 711-723.  
Hughen, J.C., & McDonald, C.G. (2005). Who are the noise traders? The Journal of 
      Financial Research, 28, 281-298.  
Jevons, W.S. (1965). The theory of political economy (reprinted 5th ed.). New York: A.M. Kelley.  
     (Originally published in 1871). 
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice. American  
      Psychologist, 58, 697-720. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979).  Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under 
      risk. Econometrica, 47, 111-132.  
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American 
     Psychologist, 39, 341-350. 
Kareev, Y. (2000). Seven (and indeed, plus or minus two) and the detection of correlations. 
    Psychological Review, 107, 397-402.  
Karmarkar, U.S. (1978). Subjectively weighted utility: A descriptive extension of the 
     expected utility model. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 21, 61-72. 
Kileen, P. (1994). Mathematical principles of reinforcement: Based on the correlation of behaviour 
     with incentives in short-term memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 105-172. 
Kubovy, M., & Gilden, D. L. (1990). Apparent randomness is not always the complement of  
     apparent order. In G. Lockhead & J. R. Pomerantz (Eds.), The perception of structure: Essays 
     in honor of Wendell R. Garner (pp. 115-127). Washington, DC: American Psychological 
     Association. 
Lopes, L. L., & Oden, G. C. (1987). Distinguishing between random and nonrandom events.  
    Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13, 392–400. 
Machina, M.J. (1982). Expected utility analysis without the independence axiom.  
     Econometrica, 50, 277-323. 
Markowitz, H. (1952). The utility of wealth. Journal of political economy, 60, 151-158. 
Nalebuff, B. (1989). Puzzles: The other person's envelope is always greener. Journal  
     of Economic Perspectives, 3, 171-181. 
Nickerson, R.S. (2002). The production and perception of randomness. Psychological Review, 
     109, 330-357. 
Nickerson, R.S., & Falk, R. (2006). The exchange paradox: Probabilistic and  
     cognitive analysis of a psychological conundrum. Thinking and Reasoning, 12,  
     181-213.  
Petrocelli, J.V., & Harris, A.K. (2011). Learning inhibition in the Monty Hall problem: The role of 
     dysfunctional counterfactual prescription. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
     37, 1297-1311 
Rakow, T., & Newell, B.R. (2010). Degrees of uncertainty: An overview and framework for future 
29 SWITCHING DUE TO EGOCENTRIC FRAMING     
 
  
      research on experience-based choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 1–14. 
Redelmeier, D.A., & Tibshirani, R.J. (1999). Why cars in the next lane seem to go  
     faster? Nature, 401, 35.  
Redelmeier, D.A., & Tibshirani, R.J. (2000). Are those drivers really going faster?  
     Chance, 13, 8-14.  
Samet, D., Samet, I. & Schmeidler, D. (2004). One observation behind two-envelope  
     puzzle. American Mathematical Monthly, 111, 347-351. 
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988). Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk and 
     Uncertainty, 1, 7-59. 
Savage, L.J. (1954). Historical and critical comments on utility. In L.J. Savage, The 
     foundations of statistics (pp. 91-104). New York: Wiley. 
Sloman, S.A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 3- 
     22.   
Sobel, J. (1994). Two envelopes. Theory and Decision, 36, 69-96. 
Stanovich, K.E., & West, R.F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications 
      for the rationality debate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645-665. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
      biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of  
      choice. Science, 211, 455-458. 
von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. 
      Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Zabell, S.(1988). Symmetry and its discontents. In B. Skyrms and W.L. Harper  
      (Eds.), Causation, chance, and credence (pp. 155-190). Dordrecht : Kluwer  
      Academic Publishers. 
30 SWITCHING DUE TO EGOCENTRIC FRAMING     
 
  
Footnotes 
 
1.    For example, Nickerson and Falk (2006) propose the following solution for the version of the 
paradox featuring complete uncertainty with respect to envelope and contents: One envelope 
contains X dollars; the expected value of the contents of the other envelope is 1.25X dollars. Since I 
do not know which envelope I hold, the expected value of its contents is 1.125X dollars, and since 
that exactly is also the expected value of the contents of the other player's envelope, both of us have 
no reason to trade. Thus, the desired conclusion is reached.  
 
2.    That the customary formulation arouses the fallacy does not entail that it is impossible to obtain a 
rational solution within it. So is the solution proposed by Nickerson and Falk, described in Footnote 1. 
Note, however, that the line of reasoning used in that solution is somewhat awkward, since its first 
step asserts an unnecessary asymmetry between envelope contents (one envelope contains X 
dollars; the expected value of the contents of the other one is 1.25X dollars). The acentric formulation 
does away with any asymmetry. It is, therefore, more apt for avoiding fallacies. 
 
3.    Note that any deviation from acentricity leads to a bias (Jeff Miller, personal communication). 
Suppose I take an altercentric point of view, assuming that the other player has a definite amount, Y, 
while I have either 2Y dollars or Y/2 dollars. In that case, my choice is between having Y in case I opt 
for trading, and having an even mixture of two states of my own assets, 2Y or Y/2, in case I opt not to 
trade. Since the expected value of the latter is 1.25Y dollars, I would be tempted to strictly prefer it 
(rather than be indifferent between the options, as the acentric point of view leads to). 
 
4.    Not 0.5·2c + 0.5·c2 = 1.25c, as suggested by an egocentrically disposed intuition (at least of one 
expert reader of a previous version of this paper ). 
 
5.    Actually, such a conclusion from any conceivable base of evidence is quite absurd, since residual 
life expectancy, being sensitive to multiple factors as well as to present age, is not likely to be affected 
by any single T in such a simple manner. That, however, is no guarantee that people, and not only 
laypersons, do not tend to draw such conclusions.  
 
6.     Ironically, that conclusion is false, to the extent that the preference for higher rate of progress is 
due to a motivation to shorten one’s travel time. Though people seem to rarely realize this, it is trivially 
true that since time and rate are reciprocally related, the effect on travel time of reducing one’s 
progress rate by a factor of R is absolutely larger than the effect of increasing it by the same factor.  
 
7.    In a pre-test designed to get some idea of the prevalence of a disposition to switch, we asked 58 
students to imagine themselves in the following situation: "You are last in a queue for a cashier in a 
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small supermarket, and the pace of your progress seems to be slow. There is another cashier in the 
supermarket. You cannot see its queue, but you are told that the two queues are of the same length. 
You are further told that the pace of progress in one of the two queues is twice as fast as in the other 
one, but you are not told which of them is the faster going one".    
Asked whether they would choose to switch to the other queue, as many as 36% of the respondents 
replied positively. This seems to be a fairly high proportion, considering that there are quite a few 
reasons to stick with the status-quo - some rational (e.g., "It takes extra time to leave the present 
queue, then move to the other one"), some irrational (e.g., "With my bad luck, better not pushing it"). 
On top of that, when presented in a further question with the mathematical argument that underlies 
the exchange paradox, 29% of the respondents found that argument reasonable. 
 
8.    Another possible cause is that drivers may perceive the switch-stay dilemma somewhat 
differently. Participants in the experiments reported here were explicitly told that speeds in the two 
lanes were always related by either a given ratio (1/2) or its inverse (2). That feature of multiplicative 
symmetry characterizes also the envelopes problem. The paradox results from the fact that such 
multiplicative symmetry probably lures the participant by appearing to preclude additive symmetry, 
namely by suggesting that the gain exceeds the absolute value of the cost. If drivers on a real-world 
road perceived the dilemma as having rather additive symmetry (namely, gain equals loss, in absolute 
values), they would have no temptation to overswitch. It does not seem very plausible, though, that 
people perceive the possible relationship between two speeds, or of any other two rates of a continual 
process for that matter, in terms of a difference (bewteen them or between their distances from the 
status-quo). Perceiving it in terms of ratios seems to be the natural way. 
   
9.    As argued in the section "Source of the fallacy", even when one realizes that her state is 
unspecified, as it is in the envelopes problem, she seems to regard it as definite (for example, "I have 
Y dollars in my envelope"), thereby relegating the uncertainty to the state of the outside world (in this 
particular instance, the content of the other player's envelope – either 2Y or Y/2). A conceivable way 
such an idea may come about is by tacitly presuming an asymmetric narrative of the generating 
process: I won Y by some allotment or lottetry; then the other player was endowed either 2Y or Y/2 by 
a flip of a fair coin.  
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Appendix A 
 
Do you feel you switched lanes frequently? 
By your estimate, how many times did you switch? 
 
[new page] 
 
Have you used to switch in a certain state that you can describe? 
If so, what was it? 
 
[new page] 
 
When you opted for switch, what was your main argument for doing so? 
 
[new page] 
 
Since you must have been aware of the risk that the switch would harm you, why did you nonetheless 
opted for it when you did? 
 
[new page] 
 
      Now imagine yourself in the following situation: 
      You and some other person receive each a sealed envelope. In each envelope there is a sum of  
      money.  You are not told what the sums are, but you are informed that one of the sums, which one is 
      unbeknown to you, is twice as high as the sum in the other envelope. 
      You are forbidden to open the envelope for an hour. However, you are allowed to exchange 
      envelopes with the other person.  
 
      Would you choose to exchange envelopes or to keep the envelope you received? (think about that for 
      at least a minute at least before you reply).  
 
[new page] 
 
In any event, explain your choice fully. 
 
[new page] 
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Some people choose to exchange envelopes based on the following argument: The probability is 1/2 
that the other person received twice as much as I did, and 1/2 – that he received half of what I 
received. So, if I exchange envelopes with him, my chance to earn a sum matching what I have in my 
envelope equals my chance to lose a half of what I have there. Hence, the exchange is worthwhile.  
 
In view of this argument, would you choose to exchange envelopes or to keep the envelope you 
received? (Give it some thought, for at least a minute, before you reply) 
 
[new page] 
 
In any event, explain your choice fully 
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Table 1.  Mean correlations between response (switch=1, stay=0), as a function of trial history, and 
(a) actual speed of traffic in the participant's lane, (b) relative speed between lanes.  
 
                                        Variable being correlated with response 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                          Actual speed               Relative speed                Mean difference 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Trial history            
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                             
ARSS-encouraging                  -0.295                          -0.478                              -0.183         
(N=62)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                             
ARSS-discouraging                  -0.196                          -0.244                              -0.048         
(N=32)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                             
Overall                                       -0.262                         -0.399                              -0.137         
(N=94)  
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Table 2.  Mean per-participant switch rate (standard deviation in parentheses) as a function of trial 
history, participant lane speed and sub-session (across all participants - in A; across just the 
participants in the "others" category - in B).  
                                                                           Participant lane speed 
                                         
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                            Sub-session Faster                      Slower                 Overall  
                                          
________________________________________________________________________ 
ARSS-encouraging   First half        0.190 (0.206)  0.690 (0.289)     0.441 (0.354) 
         (N=62)           Second half   0.206 (0.259)  0.663 (0.307)    0.435 (0.364) 
                                           
_________________________________________________________________________ 
                    Overall           0.198 (0.233)          0.677 (0.297)       
_________________________________________________________________________________
_  
                                                                                        
 
                         Sub-session   Faster        Slower       Overall  
                                          
________________________________________________________________________ 
ARSS-discouraging  First half     0.273 (0.226)    0.517 (0.306)        0.395 (0.294) 
            (N=32)          Second half   0.285 (0.290)     0.500 (0.307)       0.392 (0.315) 
                                           
_________________________________________________________________________ 
                           Overall       0.279 (0.258)      0.508 (0.304)       
                                                                                              
                                                                                              A   
 
 
 
                                                                                Participant lane speed 
                                         
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
37 SWITCHING DUE TO EGOCENTRIC FRAMING     
 
  
                                Sub-session  Faster       Slower       Overall  
                                          
___________________________________________________________________________ 
ARSS-encouraging   First half    0.297 (0.197)   0.501 (0.203)    0.381 (0.239) 
      (N=38)                Second half   0.333 (0.259)   0.455 (0.199)     0.383 (0.266) 
                                           
____________________________________________________________________________ 
                                Overall  0.315 (0.229)   0.478 (0.201)       
______________________________________________________________________________  
                                                                                        
 
                                Sub-session              Faster       Slower                 Overall  
                                          
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
ARSS-discouraging   First half        0.323 (0.221)     0.438 (0.247)            0.399 (0.224) 
        (N=26)             Second half   0.346 (0.290)    0.420 (0.240)         0.394 (0.237) 
                                           
_________________________________________________________________________ 
                               Overall           0.335 (0.255)          0.429 (0.242)       
                                                                                            
                         B 
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Table 3.  Mean per-participant ARSS-compatible rate (standard deviation in parentheses), as a 
               function of trial history, participant lane speed and sub-session (across all 
               participants - in A; across just the participants in the "others" category - in B). 
 
                                                           Participant lane speed 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                             Sub-session   Faster              Slower                    Overall  
                                          
______________________________________________________________________ 
ARSS-encouraging   First half          0.810 (0.206)   0.691 (0.289)     0.750 (0.257) 
         (N=62)              Second half   0.794 (0.259)    0.663 (0.307)        0.729 (0.290) 
                                           
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                 Overall       0.802 (0.233)          0.677 (0.297)       
______________________________________________________________________________  
                                                                                        
 
                         Sub-session  Faster            Slower              Overall  
                                          
___________________________________________________________________________ 
ARSS-discouraging    First half        0.727 (0.226)           0.517 (0.306)            0.622 (0.287) 
            (N=32)          Second half     0.715 (0.290)           0.500 (0.307)            0.608 (0.315) 
                                           
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                   Overall        0.721 (0.258)          0.508 (0.304)       
                                                                                              
                                                                                              A   
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                                                                                Participant lane speed 
                                         
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                 Sub-session  Faster                Slower                Overall  
                                          
___________________________________________________________________________ 
ARSS-encouraging  First half        0.703 (0.197)    0.501 (0.203)        0.602 (0.223) 
      (N=38)              Second half   0.666 (0.259)    0.455 (0.199)   0.561 (0.253) 
                                           
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
                          Overall       0.685 (0.229)          0.478 (0.201)       
_________________________________________________________________________________
_  
                                                                                        
 
                             Sub-session  Faster           Slower              Overall  
                                          
________________________________________________________________________ 
ARSS-discouraging  First half      0.677 (0.221)     0.438(0.247)      0.557 (0.261) 
        (N=26)              Second half  0.654 (0.290)    0.420 (0.240)      0.537 (0.289) 
                                           
_______________________________________________________________________ 
                           Overall        0.665 (0.255)    0.429 (0.242)       
                                                                                            
                         B 
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Table 4.  Pearson correlation coefficients between per-participant differential reinforcement 
rate in trials 2-29 and three per-participant measures of performance in trials 30-60 (excluding 47 & 
48), separately for the two different history conditions (in A), and pooled across conditions (in B) . 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Differential reinforcement rate in trials 2-29 
 in which speed in participant's lane is 
                  Performance in trials 30-60     Slower            Faster       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  
ARSS-encouraging      Stay rate in "Faster" trials                 0.401***        0.387**      
(N=62)                               Switch rate in "Slower" trials        0.598***                     0.536***   
                                          ARSS-compatible rate              0.597***                     0.529*** 
  
ARSS-discouraging           Stay rate in "Faster" trials       0.053                0.092   
(N=32)                               Switch rate in "Slower" trials     0.049                 0.073   
                                          ARSS-compatible rate       0.051                      0.132 
*  p<0.05,   ** p<0.01 , *** p<0.001 
 
A 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Differential reinforcement rate in trials 2-29 
 in which speed in participant's lane is 
 
Performance in trials 30-60                               Slower                      Faster         
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Stay rate in "Faster" trials                                 0.308**                     0.315**                        
Switch rate in "Slower" trials                           0.463***                  0.438***   
ARSS-compatible rate                                        0.462***                    0.445*** 
                                 
*  p<0.05,   ** p<0.01 , *** p<0.001    
  
B
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1.  An illustration of the participants’ screen. While the cars displayed were heading toward 
the top of the screen, the participant's car was never seen moving up; it was rather stationary at 
the bottom of the screen (in this case in the left lane) and was somewhat larger. The surroundings 
(marked by icons of electricity poles on the road margins) "moving" toward the bottom. All other 
cars within the same lane were also seen as basically stationary (except for slight jitters). Cars in 
the other lane, when visible, were seen "moving" up when their speed was higher or down when 
their speed was lower.   
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